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Abstract: This article examines the relationship between the conspicuous and compli-
cated terms of transcendence and immanence, which may equally be defined as essen-
tially connected or diametrically opposed. Recent developments in two largely unrelated 
sets of scholarship—the re-evaluation of secularization, and the relationship between 
medieval and modern philosophy—provide a helpful means to arrive at a clearer under-
standing of this challenging problem. Charles Taylor and Jan Aertesn act as foci for these 
developments, particularly through their respective concerns with epistemic framing in 
relation to transcendence and immanence, and the role of transcendentals in medieval 
philosophy. This examination brings these two concepts together, examining the idea of 
transcendentals offered by both Aquinas, a thinker of the transcendent frame, and Kant, 
a thinker of the immanent frame. From this juxtaposition, we can offer two contrasting 
understandings of the relationship between transcendence and immanence from within 
both the transcendent and immanent frames. Finally, two brief literary examples demon-
strate how these two ways of reading transcendence and immanence may be employed 
in the contextual understanding of religious writing. To understand the unity and division 
between transcendence and immanence is to better comprehend two primary terms in the 
study of religion and to appreciate a fundamental development in the history of religion 
in the West.
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Two words central and indispensable, yet contested and confused, within the 
study of religion are “transcendence” and “immanence.” The Oxford English 
Dictionary describes “transcendence” in relation to the deity: “The attribute of 
being above and independent of the universe; distinguished from immanence,” 
appending “see immanent” to its description.
1
 When we turn to “immanent,” 
we find two relevant definitions. The first, relating to both theology and philos-
ophy, defines the term as “existing or operating within … pervading and sus-
taining the universe,” providing God as a specific example. The second  relates 
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specifically to Kantian philosophy and defines the immanent as that which is 
“limited to or valid for the realm of experience or empirical knowledge.” The 
dictionary’s definition adds that this is “contrasted to the transcendent.”
2
 Here, 
we find two diametrically opposed definitions of immanence, at least in terms 
of how they relate to transcendence. The one maintains a fundamental relation-
ship between the two, with a transcendent God also immanent in all creation, 
while the other distinguishes the two as opposites, with any direct access to 
the transcendent cut off. To understand these opposing definitions is to grasp 
the profound differences in the fundamental theological underpinning of the 
nature of meaning found in texts from the medieval and modern periods, and to 
appreciate a fundamental development in the history of Western Christianity. It 
is only when these contextual differences in definition are taken into account 
that these essential yet problematic terms can be employed with a degree of 
clarity.
The relationship between transcendence and immanence is considered here 
by bringing together two sets of recent scholarship, both of which shed light on 
this problem but approach it from different temporal vantage points. The first, 
the recent consideration of secularization, looks from our present position back-
wards. It reveals a complicated process of religious evolution as opposed to a 
story of simple institutional decline. The second is the endeavour to understand 
the philosophical dimension of medieval scholasticism, often problematically 
reconstructed through categories or concepts anachronistic to its theological 
concerns. This examination is not directly concerned with either the definition 
of secularization or medieval philosophy but rather with what both of these can 
tell us about the relationship of transcendence and immanence.
Much has been contributed to both of these groups of scholarship, but here 
we will focus upon two particular contributions. For the former, we take what 
has now become the modern locus classicus of secularization studies, Charles 
Taylor’s A Secular Age.
3
 For the latter, we take the recent study of Jan Aertsen, 
Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought: From Philip the Chancellor 
(ca. 1225) to Francisco Suárez, one of the most substantial contributions to 
the study of medieval philosophy this century.
4
 First, in the context of their 
respective fields, this examination outlines Taylor’s idea of a shift in epistemic 
frames from transcendent to immanent and Aertsen’s account of medieval phi-
losophy as a transcendental way of thought. We then take these two terms 
and, turning ad fontes, examine the contrasting definitions of transcenden-
tals offered by both Aquinas, a thinker of the transcendent frame, and Kant, a 
thinker of the immanent frame. From this juxtaposition, it is possible to offer 
two contrasting understandings of the relationship between transcendence and 
immanence from within both the transcendent and immanent frames. Finally, 
two brief literary examples demonstrate how we may employ these opposed 
understandings of the relationship between transcendence and immanence as a 
means for understanding religious writing within its given context.
 Transcendence and Immanence 189
Epistemic Framing from the Study of Secularization
The first set of scholarship this examination engages asks the question: “What 
is secularization?” The “secularization thesis” developed by and from the work 
of the founding thinkers of modern social theory, such as Max Weber, Karl 
Marx, and Émile Durkheim, postulated an inverse relationship between mod-
ernization and religion. The thesis mapped the decline of institutional religion 
onto the primary developments of modernity, such as Renaissance humanism 
and the Reformation, establishing a connection between modernization and 
religious decline. However, toward the close of the last century, there increas-
ingly emerged a widespread interdisciplinary consensus that the thesis was 
fundamentally flawed.
5
 Practical objections, such as the growth of religion in 
the Global South, its persistence in the United States, and the increasing rec-
ognition of new categories of non-institutional religion (or spirituality), chal-
lenged the universality of the thesis.
6
 Equally, theoretical objections emerged, 
including the postmodern opposition to totalizing modernist narratives and 
the possibility of multiple simultaneous narratives.
7
 In addition, some argu-
ments have called into question the ontological assumptions that have barred 
the theological and the metaphysical from legitimate participation in scholarly 
discourse, thereby challenging the assumptions that have defined secular phi-
losophy.
8
 From both these practical and theoretical objections emerged a much 
more complicated typology of modern religion and the secular, wherein the 
relationship between the secular and the eternal, the profane and the sacred, 
and the temporal and the spiritual is not simply a narrative of divergence but a 
complex story of shifting alignments.
9
Against the backdrop of this wholesale re-evaluation of the idea of secular-
ization, Taylor’s A Secular Age made an important contribution by providing 
an epistemic framework for considering the process of secularization through 
his introduction of the concept of the “immanent frame.” In the immanent 
frame, Taylor explains, answers to fundamental questions concerning mean-
ing, value, and the truth may be found wholly within the natural order, whereas 
in the transcendent frame, these have their ultimate source in the supernatural 
 order.
10
 According to A Secular Age, to understand this shift makes it possible 
to  answer a central question concerning the development of religion: “How did 
we move from a condition where, in Christendom, people lived naïvely within 
a theistic construal, to one in which … unbelief has become for many the major 
default option?”
11
This shift in epistemic frameworks is equally characterized by a shift in 
the nature of the self, from what Taylor calls a porous to a buffered self.
12
 The 
 porous self occupied the theurgic cosmos of the medieval period, wherein all 
finite reality was shaped by the transcendent forces in which it participated. 
Whether understood as God, angels, or demons, individuals could interact 
and influence these forces through sacraments, magic, or prayer. Over a long 
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period, Taylor’s A Secular Age outlines how this transcendent world view 
changed through the exercise of discipline and reform, which tamed uncon-
trolled and supernatural forces. Coalescing in the Reformation, and affected 
through a growing middle class, this process of discipline sought to control 
disruptive beliefs and practices to ensure a well-ordered and industrious so-
ciety. The model for the buffered self’s relationship to God was the inner jus-
tification through faith, made apparent through the fruits of grace.
13
 In this 
manner, through a wide-ranging narrative, Taylor describes a shift from a the-
ocentric outlook, wherein a porous self participates in a hierarchical, vertically 
orientated cosmos, where meaning ultimately resides in the supernatural, to 
an anthropocentric outlook, wherein a buffered self was part of a disciplined 
society, horizontally orientated, and possessed of a telos of autarky.
14
According to Taylor, the present-day secular age is not characterized by a 
conscious choice made by individuals between different ways of conceptual-
izing the world. Rather, it is the result of a fundamental change in “the whole 
context of understanding in which our moral, spiritual or religious experience 
and search takes place.”
15
 As we will come to see, this shift leaves us with two 
differing understandings of the relationship between transcendence and imma-
nence based upon the epistemic frame in which they are encountered.
A Focus on Transcendentals from the Study of  
Medieval Philosophy
The second set of scholarship this examination draws from asks the question: 
“What is medieval philosophy?” This question brings up further correlate 
problems, such as the relationship between philosophy and theology and the 
role of medieval scholasticism in the development of modern philosophy.
16
 
According to the contribution of Jan Aertsen, these secondary questions have 
problematically shaped the reception of scholasticism. He cites four examples 
in particular: first, the self-enclosed Christian metaphysics of Étienne Gilson, 
which centred upon God’s revelation of divine Being to Moses, but problem-
atically did so apart from Greek metaphysics;
17
 second, the Anglo-analytical 
approach to medieval philosophy, which emphasized the importance of the 
period’s logical and semantic insights but significantly downplayed its met-
aphysical and theological concerns;
18
 third, the contribution of the influential 
Alain de Libera, who used the development of the private intellectual pursuit 
of knowledge to define medieval philosophy as the emergence of an ethical and 
humanistic way of thought, yet did so by relying upon a selective appropriation 
of materials rather than by providing an overall picture;
19
 and finally, a range 
of recent scholars who have aimed to connect developments in later medieval 
philosophy to Kant’s transcendental idealism but who problematically assume 
a proto-Kantianism that they are seeking to find.
20
 In this manner, particularly 
in relation to the latter three examples of scholarship, Aerten’s approach bears 
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some structural similarity to the rereading of the secularization thesis: just as 
that thesis sought to show the inevitable decline of religion based on modern 
institutional diminution, each of these approaches attempted to show the inev-
itable trajectory of trends within medieval philosophy toward a given selected 
modern concern, whether linguistic, humanistic, or idealist.
Aertsen instead develops a method that, he claims, constructs the period not 
from the perspective (and concerns) of contemporary modern readers but from 
within medieval philosophy itself. When this is done, what we find, accord-
ing to Aertsen’s Medieval Philosophy, is that from the thirteenth century right 
through to Suárez, the enterprise of medieval scholastic thought is fundamen-
tally concerned with the question of transcendentals. Aertsen does not offer a 
definition of the transcendentals, an ever-evolving and debated concept, but he 
does offer a description of them, beginning with an account of their plurality, 
which almost always consists of being (ens), one (unum), true (verum), and 
good (bonum), with ens as primary. Overall, there are two ways the transcen-
dentals are understood. The first is as what transcends and goes beyond every 
being. This definition concerns God, who transcends all being. The second is 
as what is common of predication, as in that which is predicated of all beings. 
This definition concerns things and what is common to their being.
21
 The ten-
sion between these two possibilities is what plays out in the history of medi-
eval philosophy. It is tempting to call the former the realist position and the 
latter nominalist, but as Aertsen’s 750-plus-page study illustrates, to simplify 
the argument to such specificities is not possible.
As a result of this complexity, Aertsen develops his own set of thematic 
considerations that are based around a historically systematic consideration 
of the transcendentals: first is the relationship between ens as primary, and the 
posterior nature of the other transcendentals; second, how the transcendentals 
constitute the proper subject of metaphysics as First Philosophy; third, what 
the relationship is between the ontological and the theological nature of the 
transcendentals as divine names; fourth is whether the transcendentals are to 
be understood analogically or univocally; and finally is the consideration of 
the epistemology of the transcendentals as the first things knowable by the 
intellect.
22
 Taken together, the question of the transcendentals is not one of 
many philosophical issues for medieval philosophy but, according to Aertsen, 
its fundamental object of concern.
In highlighting the importance of the transcendentals as the definitive issue 
for medieval philosophy, Aertsen is also making a further claim concerning 
the interpretation of medieval philosophy vis-à-vis modern philosophy. The 
term “transcendental” is most often encountered by the student of philosophy 
in relation to Kant’s transcendental idealism. Kant’s appropriation of the term 
has led to what Aertsen sees as a problematic reconstruction of the medieval 
consideration of the transcendentals, reading back into medieval philosophy 
the sources of Kant’s transcendental idealism.
23
 Throughout Medieval Philos-
ophy as Transcendental Thought, Aertsen demonstrates this tendency to be 
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fundamentally problematic, hindering our understanding of medieval philos-
ophy and undermining a construction of the period within its own context. To 
understand medieval philosophy through Aertsen’s thesis, as fundamentally 
transcendental thought, is to understand it through the period’s own intrinsic 
central concern, distinguishing the medieval mode of transcendental thought 
fundamentally from the Kantian mode.
Transcendentals in Aquinas and Kant
With the work of both Taylor and Aertsen set out, it is now possible to bring 
their two contributions together and address the central question of the relation 
of transcendence and immanence by comparing Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) 
and Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). From Taylor, we take the notion of epis-
temic frames, comparing Aquinas, as a thinker of the transcendent frame, to 
Kant, as a thinker of the immanent frame; from Aertsen, we take the transcen-
dentals as our criterion for comparison.
Aquinas is a well-placed medieval figure to contrast with the modern figure of 
Kant for the consideration of the transcendentals. The transcendentals are central 
to Aquinas’s thought and can be found throughout his works, though he did not 
produce a treatise specifically concerned with them. According to Aertsen, they 
receive their fullest general elaboration in De veritate, under the considerations 
of the true and the good.
24
 In the first of these, dealing with the question of “what 
is truth?” Aquinas offers what Aertsen calls the most systematic derivation of the 
transcendentals in the thirteenth century.
25
 This account went on to become an 
authoritative model in the history of the doctrine of the transcendentals.
26
 Aquinas 
elaborates on the plurality of the transcendentals but also argues for the conceptual 
priority of being, since it is included in everything the mind apprehends. Artic-
ulating this position, Aquinas writes, “all the other conceptions of the intellect 
are necessarily received by addition to being. But nothing can be added to being 
as though it were something not included in being—in the way that a difference 
is added to a genus or an accident to a subject—for every nature is essentially a 
being.”
27
 Here, Aquinas is articulating that what is added to being lies outside 
the concept itself. Hence, posterior transcendentals express modes of being not 
contained within being itself. However, posterior transcendentals are not added 
to being in the conventional sense of an addition from outside, as that which is 
extrinsic to the essence of being is nothing.
For the purposes of this inquiry, what is most important in Aquinas’s con-
sideration of the transcendentals is the connection between the  ontological 
 nature of the transcendentals as common to all things and the theological 
 nature of the transcendentals as divine names. The transcendentals are ontolog-
ically anterior to all other divine names because of the logical order of  human 
 understanding: “these names ‘being [ens] and good [bonum], one [unum], 
true [verum]’ precede the other divine names simply according to the reason 
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of understanding, which is evident from their commonness.”
28
 Aquinas rea-
sons that the less determinate names are, and the more universally they can be 
 applied, the more properly they can be said to be names of God.
29
The question that occupied Aquinas, and so many other scholastic minds, 
was how these transcendentals related to God, who like the transcendentals 
was equally common to all things yet transcended them. Aquinas found his 
answer in analogical predication. The transcendentals could not be predicated 
of God univocally (that is, having only one possible meaning) because of the 
priority of God and the posterior nature of creatures. Nor could they be equiv-
ocally predicated (that is, having multiple possible meanings) because of the 
relationship between creation and God. Instead, the transcendentals are predi-
cated analogically, and we come to what Aquinas calls an imperfect knowledge 
of God through all things in creation, which are God’s effects.
30
For Aquinas, the transcendentals describe a relationship wherein all imma-
nent reality is saturated with transcendence based upon the causal relation-
ship between God the transcendent creator and immanent creation.
31
 Aquinas 
maintains that “deus est omnia ut causa omnium” (“God is everything as the 
cause of everything”).
32
 Consequently, God cannot be understood as some-
thing transcendent over and against immanent creation. Rather, as the cause 
of everything, God is radically transcendent, distinguished from everything as 
the First Being (primum ens) and not dependent upon any prior cause for exist-
ence as “Being itself” (ipsum esse per se subsistens).
33
 At the same time, also 
as the cause of everything, God is also immanent, since all creatures partici-
pate in God, who determines their natures.
34
 It is through this immanence that 
we come to know transcendence: “because we come to a knowledge of God 
from other things, the reality in the names said of God and other things belong 
by priority in God according to His mode of being, but the meaning of the 
name belongs to God by posteriority. And so He is said to be named from His 
 effects.”
35
 Through the universal presence of the transcendentals in immanent 
creation, we come to imperfectly know the transcendent God.
Kant defines the transcendentals in intentional opposition to medieval phi-
losophy.
36
 Referring to the “transcendental philosophy of the ancients” in the 
“Transcendental Analytic” of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, he singles out for 
criticism the position “so famous among the scholastics: quodlibet ens unum, 
verum, bonum [every being is one true, and good].”
37
 Kant accepts these tran-
scendentals as “logical requirements and criteria for the cognition of all things 
in general.”
38
 However, he argues that the medieval understanding of them was 
mistaken, as they constitute “nothing but logical requirements and criteria of all 
knowledge of things in general, and lay out for such knowledge the categories 
of quantity, namely, unity, plurality, and totality.”
39
 The error of medieval phi-
losophy, according to Kant, was to have “converted [the transcendentals] from 
criteria of thought to be properties of things in themselves without care.”
40
 
Kant’s philosophical position goes on to develop his transcendental idealism, 
wherein the transcendentals reside within the mind of the knower alone: “I call 
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all knowledge transcendental which is occupied not so much with objects, but 
rather with our mode of cognition of objects, so far as this is meant to be pos-
sible a priori.”
41
 It was this relocation of the transcendentals, from the mind of 
God as divine ideas to the mind of humans as the categories of understanding, 
that constitutes the essence of Kant’s Copernican Revolution, which separated 
the transcendentals from the transcendent.
For Kant, the transcendent is set over and against immanence. He considers 
the transcendent as that which “flies beyond” the borders of possible experi-
ence, and the immanent as that which is “entirely within the limits of possible 
experience.”
42
 The a priori transcendentals structure our experience; however, 
unlike in Aquinas’s position, they do not reveal the transcendent cause behind 
creation but instead the structure of one’s own mind. Kant’s critical philoso-
phy does not deny the existence of God, but it does deny the possibility of the 
knowledge of God. This is behind Kant’s famous pronouncement in the second 
preface to the first Kritik, which claimed that it was necessary to limit reason 
in order to make room for faith.
43
 Metaphysical speculation without empirical 
verification leads to the paralogisms and antinomies of pure reason.
44
 It is this 
restriction on the employment of speculative reason that lies behind the dem-
olition of the rational arguments for the existence of God that Kant carried out 
in the transcendental dialectic.
45
Reading Transcendence and Immanence
Two brief examples, taken not from philosophy but literature, demonstrate 
how these opposed understandings of the relationship between transcendence 
and immanence may be employed. For a representative of the transcendent 
frame, wherein immanence is saturated with transcendence, we may take the 
lai “Yönec” by the twelfth-century poet Marie de France. In this tale of magic 
and mal-mariée, an old lord imprisons his beautiful, young wife in a tower, 
fearful that she may someday be unfaithful. One day, reflecting on the stories 
of noble knights and beautiful ladies, she cries out: “Deus, ki du tut ad poësté, / 
Il en face ma volenté!” (God, for whom all is possible / Grant me my wish!)
46
 
At this moment, a hawk flies through her window and transforms into a knight. 
To prove himself worthy, and allay her doubts, the knight assumes the form 
of the lady and takes the Eucharist from her chaplain. In the world of Marie, 
the immanent is saturated with transcendence, here in the form of love, both 
universal and particular. In relation to humankind, the goodness of being works 
through an economy of love and salvation. It is God’s love that brings creation 
into being and that constitutes the motivation for Christ’s sacrifice. Equally, it 
is this same transcendent power of divine presence that allows the knight to 
become the hawk, and the host to become the body of Christ. In the transcend-
ent frame Marie occupied, everything was more than it seemed through the 
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participation of the divine transcendent forces that moved, shaped, and made 
immanent creation what it was.
We find the reverse of this in another poetic example from William 
Wordsworth, in which he expresses his concerns with the immanent frame. In 
his sonnet “The World Is Too Much with Us,” published in 1807, the Lakeland 
poet longs for an age when, looking upon nature, one could encounter a greater 
meaning beyond or within it:
This Sea that bares her bosom to the moon,
The winds that will be howling at all hours,
And are up-gathered now like sleeping flowers,
For this, for everything, we are out of tune;
It moves us not.
47
According to Wordsworth, the immanent frame is out of tune with an early 
age that would have been able to encounter meaning beyond immanence. As 
the poem progresses, Wordsworth dreams of being a pagan, who might “Have 
sight of Proteus rising from the sea; / Or hear old Triton blow his wreathèd 
horn.”
48
 Yet, despite this sense that beyond immanence there is something 
greater, he cannot find transcendence in immanence—only a reflection of his a 
priori desire for something beyond.
Neither Marie nor Wordsworth sat down with the Summa Theologiæ or the 
Kritik der reinen Vernunft in hand, with the aim of developing a poetic reflec-
tion of the philosophy of their age; indeed, Marie slightly predates Aquinas. 
Yet Marie and Aquinas, and Kant and Wordsworth, respectively, share in these 
works two different understandings of the relationship between transcend-
ence and immanence. In the world of Marie de France, God could be found 
in all things, manifest through an economy of salvation and love; while in 
Wordsworth’s, the transcendent was entirely separated from immanence, ban-
ished, as reflected in the Romantic’s disenchanted melancholy.
Marie’s poetry operates within the transcendent frame, in a world where 
immanence is saturated by transcendence, as it was for Aquinas. Wordsworth 
operated within the presently strengthening immanent frame that concerned 
him and his fellow Romantics. According to the logic of that intellectual 
framework, humans were bound within immanence, with any desire for 
the transcendent rendered increasingly the object of nostalgia. The insights 
 afforded by recent scholarship in the two areas represented here by Taylor and 
Aertsen set out an intellectual framework that allows us to contemplate and 
contextualize the profound differences in theological mentality underpinning 
both philosophical and literary texts from the medieval and modern periods. 
What is more, our own period’s historicization and critical awareness of sec-
ularism brings to us the interesting possibility of a further post-secular frame-
work, where the transcendent longing of Wordsworth can perhaps overcome 
modern disenchantment.
49
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